No one can predict the turnout numbers for 2012, but the assumption that higher turnout will automatically help Obama win reelection is just that—an assumption.

It is traditionally thought that high turnout elections favor Democrats, and low turnout elections favor Republicans. The assumption is that those who come out to vote in exceptional circumstances are disproportionately Democratic voters—the young and racial minorities. This conventional wisdom is so pervasive, on both sides of the aisle, that Republicans hope for rain or snow on Election Day, while Democrats hope for clear skies and mild weather. In spite of this, there are several recent examples where higher turnout actually benefitted Republicans.

While Barack Obama won an impressive victory in 2008, he did not win based on a wave of previously untapped voters. The total vote in 2008 was up seven percent from 2004—not a large boost considering 3 to 4 percent of this can be attributed to population growth in that time period.

Obama won for two reasons. One was that he won over independents. The second was that he won record majorities of Democratic-leaning groups. The share of voters who were 18-29 years old only went from 17 percent in 2004 to 18 percent in 2008, but Obama won 66 percent of this age group, as opposed to John Kerry’s 54 percent. The Latino vote only narrowly increased, going from 8 percent to 9 percent of the electorate, but Obama won 67 percent here instead of Kerry’s 53 percent. And African-Americans only went from being 11 percent of all voters to 13 percent, but receiving 95 percent of the black vote, instead of Kerry’s 88 percent, was just as important as any increase in turnout.

The 2004 presidential election is one example where higher turnout benefited Republicans. John Kerry’s presidential campaign did a good job of increasing turnout over Al Gore’s 2000 totals. He received 19 percent more votes than Gore, who won the popular vote four years before. The Kerry campaign was happy with their turnout operation, and exit polls on Election Day showing them comfortably ahead had a ring of plausibility. However, George W. Bush increased his vote total by 24 percent over his 2000 total, giving him a 3-point victory.

Another example of higher turnout aiding Republicans was the 2010 Massachusetts Senate special election. It was initially believed to be a low turnout election that would select whoever won the Democratic primary. When Scott Brown starting polling within single digits of Martha Coakley, it was because right-of-center voters were incredibly fired up, while the dominant Democratic base was listless. It was thought that Brown could win a low turnout election, but he would lose a high turnout election. Due to the extraordinary national attention devoted to the race, turnout was high—exceeding the total votes in the previous gubernatorial election. But Brown was able to score a 5-point victory despite high turnout.

This month’s Wisconsin gubernatorial recall election is yet another example. In 2008, Wisconsin actually had a decline in the number of voters compared to 2004. A lower turnout environment produced a large Obama victory. After a year of near constant conflict, the gubernatorial recall election had high turnout for a non-presidential election. It surpassed the turnout of the 2010 gubernatorial election by more than 350,000 votes. Scott Walker actually received 70,000 more votes than John McCain did, and this high turnout led to a large Republican victory.

Is there an explanation for this counterintuitive behavior? It may be the case that higher turnout brings out an electorate that is less inclined towards Democratic client groups. If we think of Wisconsin as an example, no one had more reason to vote than members of public sector unions. And in a lower turnout election, they would have more influence on the result. A higher turnout election may mobilize voters who have little connection to any political interest groups, which makes them winnable for Republicans. It’s unlikely Scott Brown could have won in a state so heavily Democratic as Massachusetts without some sizable amount of voters who would never otherwise vote in a non-presidential election.

If turnout surges this November, don’t automatically assume it means trouble for Mitt Romney.

Chris Palko works as an assistant media analyst at Smart Media Group, a Republican political media buying agency in Alexandria, Va. He is a graduate of American University and George Washington University’s Graduate School of Political Management.

A version of this post was also published on Campaign and Election’s blog, Campaign Insider.

Being up early and often helped the Republican to victory

When the Wisconsin recall election started edging forward last fall, Gov. Scott Walker (R) didn’t hesitate. He began airing ads on November 15. At that point in time, the success of the recall looked like a 50/50 proposition. For the last six weeks of 2011, Walker put in $2.4 million in paid media. The only other advertiser on the air at this time was the Democratic umbrella group Greater Wisconsin Committee. In this period, they placed only $680,000. Though Walker wasn’t saturating TV sets, he was establishing his narrative at an early point in the recall process—a critical part of his success.

The only time in which Walker was not on the air was a six-week period from mid-January to the beginning of March. In this time, Americans for Prosperity and Club for Growth carried the pro-Walker message. Americans for Prosperity put in $1.5 million and Club for Growth placed another $81,000 over two weeks. The only anti-Walker advertiser on air in this period was the League of Conservation Voters-Sierra Club, which placed a small $30,000 buy on cable. None of the Democratic big guns were up in this period, which was a missed opportunity to define the terms of the recall.

Walker was able to raise so much money that Americans for Prosperity and the Club for Growth, two of the biggest national conservative groups, felt confident the governor and his state allies would be able to handle the race without their funds. But Walker still had plenty of help. Right Direction for Wisconsin, a group associated with the Republican Governors Association, was the first outside group to come in for Walker, dropping $6.5 million. Wisconsin Manufacturers and Commerce, a business trade organization, spent $4.7 million, all over just the last five weeks. Over the last two months, Walker, Right Direction and WMC spent a combined $16.9 million.

Meanwhile, the Democratic primary process was damaging. The favorite of the unions was Kathleen Falk. Most of the money spent in the primary process was in favor of Falk, the former Dane County executive. The combined spending for Falk and the union group in her favor, Wisconsin for Falk, spent $4 million. Milwaukee Mayor Tom Barrett only had his own resources to draw upon, contributing around $1 million in the primary. In spite of this, Barrett was able to prevail. Those $4 million dollars ultimately weren’t contributed to defeat Walker, a major waste of resources.

Prior to the recall round, union officials threw around very big figures — in the tens of millions — that they would pay to defeat Walker. In paid media at least, this didn’t happen. Greater Wisconsin Committee was up in late 2011, but wouldn’t go back up on the air until late April. This was a very late start to get back on the air, particularly as it was acting as an umbrella group for different Democratic spending sources. In a phase with no Democratic candidate, they’d have been the main opposition to Walker. Going up this late may have been a fatal mistake.

When the campaign finally became a head-to-head race, Walker’s message was dominant. In the period Barrett was the formal nominee, the spending for pro-Walker forces was $13.4 million. In contrast, the spending from the pro-Barrett advertisers was merely $6.9 million. Having a 2-to-1 spending advantage helped to sustain the five-to-seven point polling lead that Walker maintained for the last two months.

It’s a bit humbling to political advertisers that total paid media spending of around $38 million dollars over the length of eight months would only move a few percent of the electorate in one direction. After all the spending, Walker most likely won because just enough Wisconsinites viewed his collective bargaining reforms as working. A large spending disparity between Walker’s side and his liberal opponents helped to set the narrative of success Walker needed to win. But spending alone isn’t what determined Walker’s fate.

Chris Palko works as an assistant media analyst at Smart Media Group, a Republican political media buying agency in Alexandria, Va. He is a graduate of American University and George Washington University’s Graduate School of Political Management.

A version of this post was also published on Campaign and Election’s blog, Campaign Insider.